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PÉTER HAJDÚ 
T H E R H E T O R I C O F SINCERITY* 
Sincerity was (and in many cases still is) a central notion in the evaluation of ancient po-
etry. The New Criticism described and discredited this kind of approach to literature as the 
"sincerity fallacy", a misconception that regarded poetry as an expression of the biographi-
cal author's psychic experience. The more direct or the more authentic this expression is, 
the higher the quality of the poetry that is created. It goes without saying that from the 
viewpoint of such a concept of literature the title of this paper seems an apparent oxymo-
ron, since rhetoric was regarded as a means of mediation that excluded the possibility of a 
direct or a sincere communication of experience. Ovid's poetry was often undervalued as 
highly rhetorical and therefore necessarily insincere. But first of all I would like to speak of 
the rhetoric of classical scholarship and the role the concept of sincerity—sometimes in 
sophisticated disguise—still tends to play in it. 
Sincerity has not been always regarded a value. The notion presupposes the modern 
individual, and the concern with it came to characterise some European cultures not sooner 
than at the beginning of modern epoch.1 Sincerity as a concept of literary theory is the heri-
tage of Romanticism, a movement that wanted poetry to be an unmediated expression of 
thoroughly penetrating experience, which can be appropriately described by the German 
term Erlebnis. Therefore, Romanticism had no confidence in traditional means of media-
tion like rhetoric or literary genres. We can hardly be surprised by the fact that classical 
philology, which in its modern form was developed in a cultural milieu basically deter-
mined by the achievements of German romantic poetry and literary criticism, has enthusias-
tically adopted these ideas and will be very reluctant to get rid of them. In the present state 
of our culture, however, we can scarcely believe in the possibility of a direct approach to 
even our own experience. The post-modern consciousness happily dismisses the hope of 
coining an unheard of language to express a unique experience, since that experience 
(which is not so unique, to start with) has already been mediated by the language to con-
sciousness. In the twentieth century even the concept of a unified personality, which could 
face a unique experience, was dismissed. On the other hand we have no access to the au-
thor's mind, and therefore we can neither verify nor refute any statement about the congru-
ity of experience and expression, and therefore even speaking of such seems nonsense. 
* The paper is part of the OTKA project No. Τ 042711 "Narrative and Rhetoric." 
1 Lionel TRILLING, Sincerity and Authenticity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1971,26. For the 
importance of sincerity in post-modern context cf. Zygmunt BAUMAN, Modernity and Ambivalence, 
Cambridge: Polity 1991,200-208. 
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The favourite figure of the New Criticism was irony, which can be regarded as the op-
posite of sincerity. It was traditionally defined as a case when the literal meaning of a 
statement is different from or rather the opposite of the intended one. The New Criticism's 
hero is no longer the sincere poet, who creates a new language to express exactly what he 
wants, but the ironical one who composes a poem that is able to indirectly hint at a different 
intended meaning. But we have problems with this intention, since it implies the supposi-
tion of an intending being, a consciousness behind the utterance that disposes over the vari-
ous, i.e., ostensible and real meanings. This consciousness, however, we cannot directly 
reach to make a comparison between its intention and the actual meaning of its utterance. It 
can be true that "we cannot conceive of speech without speakers—conveyed meaning with-
out a conveyer of meaning",2 but the bare and probably inevitable presumption of a con-
sciousness behind the utterance is insufficient to recognize its intention as different from 
the meaning of its utterance. Nevertheless some of us are able to recognize irony. Is it only 
a matter of our imagination? If I can imagine an opposite intention, or if I cannot imagine a 
sincere intention, the text becomes ironical. There are some texts that seem ironical to some 
readers and sincere to others. Lucan's eulogy on Nero at the beginning of the Pharsalia can 
figure as an obvious example.3 But those who regard a text as ironical must refer to some 
textual or contextual contradiction that signal irony, or should make the reader cautious 
about the literal meaning. Some recent definitions of irony, therefore, tend to silently dis-
miss the intention of the speaker and speak of a contradiction between words and contexts, 
or of an exploitation of deviations from syntactic or semantic norms.4 
A problem still remains: every poetic text exploits deviations from syntactic and se-
mantic norms. Actually this is exactly what poetry does. With a pinch of wit and with suffi-
ciently close reading we certainly will find contradictions in every text. Close reading re-
sults in irony. 
How can the concept of sincerity play any role in literary criticism in such a situation? 
Of course I will not discuss examples of a naïve biographical approach, which is still very 
much with us. Some scholars write as if they were living in the nineteenth century; never-
2 Paul HERNÁDI, Beyond Genre: New Directions in Literary Classification, Ithaca/London: Cor-
nell University Press 1972, 173. 
3 For an ironical reading of the eulogy see Berthe M. MARTI, The Meaning of the Pharsalia, 
AJPh 6 6 ( 1 9 4 5 ) 3 5 2 - 3 7 6 ; Emanuele GRISET, Lucanea IV: L' Elogio Neroniano, Rivista di Studi 
Classici 3 ( 1 9 5 5 ) 1 3 4 - 1 3 8 ; Otto Steen DUE, An essay on Lucan, Classica et Medievalia 2 3 ( 1 9 6 2 ) 6 8 -
1 3 2 ; Otto SCHÖNBERGER, Untersuchungen zur Wiederholungstechnik Lucans, München: C.H. Beck 
1 9 6 8 . For the other way of reading that will take it a sincere laudation see Pierre GRJMAL, L'Éloge de 
Néron au début de la Pharsale, REL 3 8 ( 1 9 6 0 ) 2 9 6 - 3 0 5 ; Lynette THOMSON, Lucan 's Apotheosis of 
Nero, CPh 1 9 ( 1 9 6 4 ) 1 4 7 - 1 5 3 ; Wolfgang D . LEBEK, Lucans Pharsalia: Dichtungsstruktur und Zeit-
bezug, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1 9 7 6 , 7 4 - 1 0 7 ; Klaus Ε. BOHNENKAMP, Zum Nero-
Elogium in Lucans Bellum civile, Μ Η 3 9 ( 1 9 7 7 ) 2 3 5 - 2 4 8 ; Erich BURCK, Werner RUTZ, Die 
Pharsalia ' Lucans, in: E. Burck (ed.), Das römische Epos, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft 1979, 161-62 
4 Roger FOWLER (ed.), A Dictionary of Modern Critical Terms, 2nd, rev. ed., London, New 
York: Routledge-Kegan Paul 1987, 128-129. (First ed. 1973.) 
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theless those ways of thinking are much more interesting that try to take into account the 
post-modern condition of literary criticism but are unable to break with the strong bio-
graphical tradition of classical scholarship. I think we can find the most suitable examples 
of sincerity criticism in the scholarly literature on Catullus, Horace and Ovid. Catullus was 
generally accepted as "Erlebnisdichter katexochen",5 and it seems to be difficult to break 
with this tradition. But not at all impossible. (I refer to the books of William Fitzgerald and 
David Wray.6) The sincerity of Horace's political poetry, on the other hand, has been a 
fiercely debated topic, which has never been independent from the political attitudes of the 
debating scholars or their contemporary social environment.7 As to the sincerity of 
Horace's love poetry let me exceptionally quote one single sentence from a book on 
Horace, which was ruled by the naive biographical attitude, "As to Horace, it may legiti-
mately be doubted whether he was ever more than ankle-deep in love."8 Ovid's love poetry 
with its cheerful tone and playful variations of all possible topics of a well-established 
genre did not entice the fans of sincerity. But the poetry of exile was many times described 
as an expression of life exceptionally immediate in classic literature, and now we can read a 
quite interesting set of analyses on the problematic nature of this immediacy. Furthermore, 
once the idea started circulating that Ovid might never have been exiled,9 we have had to 
face the possibility of a completely ironical reading of both exile poetry collections. I am 
going to analyse briefly two appearances of the sincerity approach to literature from the 
Catullus scholarship, and then I will touch on the problems of reading Horace today. 
Eve Adler10 usually finds some textual or syntactical contradictions in Catullus' po-
ems. For example, in c. 8 there is a speaking "I" (and she thinks "it is natural" that the 
speaker is Catullus [8]), an acting "you" called Catullus, and finally an acting "he" also 
called Catullus. But such contradictions, Adler insists, do not result in irony; on the con-
trary, they are markers of "direct self-revelation." (6) She thinks the poet's distance from 
the speaking persona is "part of a person's anguished self-division", (7) and Catullan poems 
communicate "a lived experience of a person" who includes and is superimposed to the 
three components: the speaker of the poem, the addressee called "Catullus", and the poet 
presenting the poem. (11) We have many Catulluses. One is acting in a life situation; an-
other one is reasoning about it; a third one composes a poem to express this reasoning; and 
there is "the person Catullus", who contains all of them and something more. "The poem is 
a conquest of the experience it expresses, and the experience is less immediate than the 
conquest." (11) 
5 Günther JACHMANN, Sappho und Catull, RhM 1 0 7 ( 1 9 6 4 ) 2 0 . 
6 William FITZGERALD, Catullan Provocations: Lyric Drama and the Drama of Position, Berke-
ley: University of California Press 1995; David WRAY, Catullus and the Poetics of Roman Manhood, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2001. 
7 Emst DOBLHOFER, Horaz in der Forschung nach 1957, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft 1992, 5-6 and 12-13. 
8 Victor G. KJERNAN, Horace: Poetics and Politics, London: MacMillan 1999, 122. 
9 A . D . FITTON BROWN, The Unreality of Ovid's Exile, Liverpool Classical Monthly 1 0 . 2 (Feb. 
1 9 8 5 ) 1 8 - 2 2 . 
10 Eve ADLER, Catullan Self-Revelation, New York: Arno Press 1981. 
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I think Adler misunderstands a concept of modern literary theory when she speaks of a 
distance of the poet from their persona, since one of the two ends of this supposed distance, 
namely the poet, cannot be experienced by reading poetry. What actually is useful is a dif-
ferentiation between poet and persona to make it clear that when we speak of a poem's 
speaking voice we do not speak of the biographical author. Adler distorts this well-known 
concept in order to bring back the idea of the author and to speak of the poet's person and 
personality, notwithstanding everything twentieth-century literary criticism had told us 
about the sterility and inadequacy of this kind of discourse. But it is only the less skilful of 
her techniques. She seems to take into consideration the modern insight into the mediated 
nature of experience, but she applies this insight in an old-fashioned model of literature, the 
key words of which are experience, expression, poet and personality. She knows that it 
would not be up to date to insist that the biographical author is identical with the poem's 
speaker, or that they were immediately expressing the poet's experience; therefore she 
makes these differences the main topic of Catullus' poetry. There is nothing especially 
Catullan in the model of the tetrahedron with the triangle of poet-speaker-agent and the 
superimposed person. A major part of lyric poetry stages an agent and a speaker, and since 
readers face a composed text they can imagine a composer of it; and then they can imagine 
the all inclusive personality all the same. But the discourse on the last two factors is an 
imaginative one, since in poetry we can only experience the poem's speaker and agent. 
When Adler makes the poem's actual topic the conquest of the experience, i.e., the com-
poser-poet's activity when writing a poem on the experience of the person-poet, she situates 
her discourse in the sphere of the imagination. She differentiates between poet and poetical 
voice only to create a theoretical framework in which she can peacefully speak of the bio-
graphical author's personality. 
Niklas Holzberg investigates much more carefully what he calls "the hidden author".11 
He explicitly, repeatedly and sometimes fiercely refuses the direct biographical reading of 
Catullan poetry. He thinks the events narrated or referred to in the poems do not communi-
cate information of the poet's life, since they belong to the persona and make up a "Catullus 
novel" (14). Nevertheless, he wants to formulate statements about the poet. Nothing can be 
told about his life and personal beliefs, he admits. But something can be told because be-
hind Catullus' speaking persona the author Catullus is hiding. "Dieser ist freilich nicht so 
versteckt, daß es sich nicht lohnen würde auch nach ihm zu fragen und zu suchen." (14) 
Derrida's readers will be reluctant to receive this idea that there is something (an author of 
all things) beyond the text. When he recognizes a Greek poem, which the Catullan one 
quotes, transforms or parodies, he describes this situation by a topographical metaphor that 
the Greek poem hides behind the Latin one. "Wieder einmal versteckt sich hinter Catulls 
Text ein anderer, und hinter den beiden Texten versteckt sich wiederum der Autor, dessen 
Anwesenheit sich freilich in seinem freien Umgang mit der Vorlage manifestiert." (55) Of 
course it is a version of intertextual reading, and Holzberg is usually brilliant at analysing 
texts. But he is not satisfied with speaking of texts interrelated by his reading process. He 
11 Niklas HOLZBERG, Catull: Der Dichter und sein erotisches Werk, München: C.H. Beck 2002, 
11-60. 
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feels a need to speak of an author, a consciousness we can reach through the text. His Ca-
tullus is insincere, and completely ironical, who plays a literary game with us. Instead of an 
immediate expression of experience the Catullan poetry appears here as a self-referential 
game of the literary medium. This approach would do without any hint at the author quite 
alright. But the ghost of the biographically focussed literary criticism haunts us here as a 
transcendental belief in a creator behind the creation, an author manifested in the poem. 
Irony, however, is not the only possible opposite of sincerity. Insincerity or lying can 
also be discussed in this context. From the viewpoint of irony, sincerity and insincerity do 
not differ too much; while an ironical text offers some contradictions to create some ten-
sions within the utterance, both sincere and insincere declarations are supposed to be com-
pletely congruent. The difference is not situated in the text but in the envisioned uttering 
personality; an insincere poet does not say what he feels either because he is unable to do 
so, or because he consciously says something different from his personal beliefs due to his 
political or financial interests. It goes without saying that we do not have evidence of the 
authors' personal beliefs in most cases. The decision of accepting a poetical utterance as 
sincere, therefore usually depends on imagination and is basically influenced by political 
preferences. Catullus's poems on Lesbia are usually regarded as sincere, those on other 
women and on Iuvencus are not, and this difference is quite probably caused by an attitude, 
which sets high value on bilaterally exclusive heterosexual love and rejects both promiscu-
ity and homosexuality. Horace's political poems will be regarded as sincere outbursts if 
sonieone has a positive opinion of Augustus' regime or authoritarian political systems in 
general. Otherwise one will need some effort to argue for Horace's sincerity. Let us see the 
theoretical methods recent scholarship develops to solve this problem, which it had better 
not discuss at all. 
Randall L.B. McNeill formulates a binary opposition of biographical and rhetorical in-
terpretations of the self-image of Horace's poetry. The first one believes that the poems 
offer a sincere and accurate record of the poet's life, while the latter treats the texts "as self 
conscious and artificial literary works, more the products of craft than of earnest self-
revelation".12 Although McNeill realises that recent scholarship tends to deny the need of 
choice between these possibilities, he thinks it is a risky strategy to leave such questions 
open, since "questions of what is real and what is invented lie at the very heart of Horace's 
poetry".13 I would like to highlight the verb lie in this sentence, which I regard as a quite 
sophisticated identification of the "invented" with a lie. It also seems to reject Fraenkel's 
postulation that "Horace... never lies".14 I do not think, however, that the question of the 
truth of the biographical statements remained open; it turned out to be inadequate. In a 
fictional medium there is neither truth nor lie, and nowadays readers tend to treat lyric po-
etry as rather a fictional and auto-referential medium than as one of direct personal declara-
tions. 
12 Randall L. B. MCNEILL, Horace: Image, Identity, and Audience, Baltimore, London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press 2001, 3. 
13 MCNEILL, o p . cit . 4 . 
14 Eduard FRAENKEL, Horace, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1957,260. 
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McNeill has the impression that different poems of the corpus offer different and in 
many cases incompatible self-portraits, and it is impossible to elaborate an all-
comprehensive image of Horace. Nevertheless he tries to do so by envisioning a poet who 
always takes into consideration the social context and speaks to different, concentrically 
growing, audiences at the same time, but "controls and directs the responses of each of his 
audiences".15 A poet able to control the responses of all readers would be a unique phe-
nomenon in the history of literature, and this hypothesis is contradicted by the fact that 
different codices contain variants, which testify to different readings. However, the very 
demand of a strategy that clarifies the differences of self-images in different poems is the 
legacy of the biographical approach to literature, since nothing can guarantee the unity of a 
corpus, i.e., a set of separate pieces of literature written by or attributed to a single author, 
but the biographical author's supposedly unified personality. 
Another interesting attempt of "biographical" reading has been made by Ellen Olien-
sis, who simply erased the differentiation between author and persona through introducing 
the notion of face.xb The poem is regarded as an utterance in a life situation; the speaker 
tries to realize a speech act, and for this he construes a face. The faces that appear in vari-
ous poems may naturally be different. The face is not a clue to the extrapoetic life, nor is it 
an immanent feature of the poetic medium. Oliensis is interested "in the life that happens in 
[Horace's] poetry" (3). This approach is compatible with a modern social theory of person-
ality, and therefore it avoids the shortages of psychologically centred biographical interpre-
tations. Face does not only mean a sort of social behaviour, but also prestige, and in this 
meaning the poem that constructs or destructs face appears as a game of power, which 
might open the way towards a post-modern reading of Horace. At the same time, however, 
the series of poems are interpreted in accordance with the scheme of a carrier story, which 
brings back biographical plots into the scholarly narrative. This is obvious in sentences 
such as the following: "The more face Horace accumulates, the less effort he needs to de-
vote to maintaining it" and "As Horace gains authority, moreover, he defers differently— 
paying more deference to Augustus and less to Maecenas" (5). We can see the plot of a 
successful life history that offers a frame to the interpretation of poems as manifestations of 
the struggle for face, i.e., for social rise. Although with the concept of face the problem of 
sincerity seems to be avoided, since this approach does not differentiate between personal 
belief and uttered content, the result is rather similar to the image of an insincere Horace 
who says what is favourable for his carrier. 
After these examples of the surviving topic of the author's personal sincerity I would 
like to turn the table and to approach to the notion of sincerity as a rhetorical achievement 
of the text. Rhetorical formation we can experience, of course, in every text; rhetoric is not 
some additional extra to embellish a previously bare linguistic expression. But the moods of 
these rhetorical formations might be rather different. Some of them might be suitable to 
being received in a given cultural context as non-rhetorical and unformed outbursts of some 
15 MCNEILL, op. cit. 5-8, the quotation is taken from page 142, note 23. 
16 Ellen OLIENSIS, Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1998. 
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sincere consciousness. The moods that we can accept as sincere probably tend not to dis-
play too obtrusively their devices and not apply mediating systems of communication that 
are not used nowadays, such as mythology. Catullus' Carm. 5, a poem widely accepted as a 
quite good example of sincerity, does not contain any references to ancient mythology or to 
particularly Roman social institutes. It operates with images of nature and a general notion 
of a generation gap instead. (Nevertheless I can imagine that in the phrase ramores senum 
seueñomm we should detect the playfully hidden denomination of the mores maiorum.) 
But we can compare it with Horace's c. 1.8, which displays a very similar topic through a 
similarly general imagery. We cannot say that Catullus' text tries to hide its rhetorical de-
vices, since the multiple anaphora is rather obvious.17 But the highly artistic play with word 
order, characteristic of Horace's melic poetry, is definitely absent here. And we can realize 
a basic difference. The Catullan poem stages what can be called a life situation in which a 
direct expression of a consciousness is possible. The speaker of the poem addresses a per-
son directly and wants her to react immediately. Horace's poem, on the other hand, is a 
calm discussion of possible life strategies the addressee of the speech may follow in other, 
various situations of the long (but according too the poem's speaker too short) period of 
youth. Teaching is usually not a life situation that can work without applying traditional 
systems to communicate previously given knowledge. 
I do not think, however, that a text is able to achieve sincerity without the reader's co-
operation. Contradiction in the text, or between text and context, can destroy sincerity if 
readers focus on them. Nobody can see the context in its totality because a perceived con-
text is always partial. Moreover it is always changing in the stream of historicity. A text in 
order to be sincere needs a reader, who is willing not to recognize contradictions. The "will-
ing suspension of disbelieve"18 is very much needed when we want to avoid ironical read-
ings. To refer to a telling example I will quote Eve Adler again, who characterizes Catullus' 
pédérastie poetry with words like "indirectness, reserve, convention, artifice" (45). More-
over she describes all the love poems addressed to persons other than Lesbia with the no-
tion of irony (47, 100). Apart from political preferences, it depends on the context, to be 
sure; if a reader is willing to accept the Lesbia poetry as sincere, and takes those poems as 
the definitive context of Catullus' pédérastie and other miscellaneous love poetry, they will 
be unwilling to accept the latter group as sincere too. 
I am very much convinced that my text is also full of contradictions. I hope that read-
ers who like irony have been enjoying them, and those who prefer sincerity were willing to 
disregard them. 
17 Cf. Ernest A . FREDRICKSMEYER, Observations on Catullus 5, AJPh 9 1 ( 1 9 7 0 ) 4 4 0 . 
,ft Samuel Taylor COLERIDGE, Biographia Literaria, ed. by James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 
Princeton: Princeton Univerity Press 1983, vol. 2 (vol. 7 of The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge), 6. 
